Structural change, collective action, and social unrest  in 1930s Spain by Domènech Feliu, Jordi & Miley, Thomas Jeffrey
  
 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers in Economic History 
 
UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID • c/ Madrid 126 • 28903 Getafe (Spain)• Tel: (34) 91 624 96 37 
Site: http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/HISEC/working_papers/working_papers_general.html  
 
DEPARTAMENTO DE  
HISTORIA ECONÓMICA  
E INSTITUCIONES 
                                                                                                      
  
 
June 2013                                                                                                  WP 13-05 
 
 
 
Structural change, collective action, and social 
unrest in 1930s Spain 
 
Jordi Domenech and Thomas Jeffrey Miley 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Spanish 2nd Republic (1931-1936) witnessed one of the fastest and deepest processes 
of popular mobilization in interwar Europe, generating a decisive reactionary wave that 
brought the country to the Civil War (1936-1939). We show in the paper that both 
contemporary comment and part of the historiography makes generalizations about the 
behaviour of the working classes in the period that stress idealistic, re-distributive and even 
religious motives to join movements of protest. In some other cases, state repression, 
poverty, and deteriorating living standards have been singled out as the main determinants 
of participation. This paper uses collective action theory to argue that key institutional 
changes and structural changes in labour markets were crucial to understand a significant 
part of the explosive popular mobilization of the period. We argue first that, before the 
second Republic, temporary migrants had been the main structural limitation against the 
stabilization of unions and collective bargaining in agricultural labour markets and in 
several service and industrial sectors. We then show how several industries underwent 
important structural changes since the late 1910s which stabilized part of the labour force 
and allowed for union growth and collective bargaining. In agricultural labour markets or in 
markets in which unskilled temporary workers could not be excluded, unions benefitted 
from republican legislation restricting temporary migrations and, as a consequence, rural 
unions saw large gains membership and participation. Historical narratives that focus on 
state repression or on changes in living standards to explain collective action and social 
conflict in Spain before the Civil War are incomplete without a consideration of the role of 
structural changes in labour markets from 1914 to 1931. 
 
Keywords: Structural change, social conflict, labour markets, Spain, Civil War, 
interwar Europe, migration, 2nd Republic 
JEL Classification: N14, N34, N44, P16, J21, J43, J51, J52, J53, J61, J88 
 
Jordi Domenech Feliu: Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones, and Researcher at 
Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III, Calle Madrid, 126, 28903 Getafe, Spain. 
E-mail: jdomenec@clio.uc3m.es  
http://www.uc3m.es/portal/page/portal/instituto_figuerola/directorio/jdomenech 
Thomas Jeffrey Miley: Department of Sociology, U. of Cambridge, Free School Lane, 
Cambridge CB2 3RQ, UK. 
E-mail: thomas.j.miley@gmail.com 
http://www.sociology.cam.ac.uk/contacts/staff/profiles/jmiley.html  
 1
 
“Structural change, collective action, and social unrest in 1930s Spain” 
 
 
Jordi Domenech (departamento de Ciencias Sociales, U. Carlos III de Madrid)  
& 
Thomas Jeffrey Miley (Department of Sociology, U. of Cambridge) 
May 2013 
 
Abstract: 
The Spanish 2nd Republic (1931-1936) witnessed one of the fastest and deepest processes of popular 
mobilization in interwar Europe, generating a decisive reactionary wave that brought the country to the 
Civil War (1936-1939). We show in the paper that both contemporary comment and part of the 
historiography makes generalizations about the behaviour of the working classes in the period that 
stress idealistic, re-distributive and even religious motives to join movements of protest. In some other 
cases, state repression, poverty, and deteriorating living standards have been singled out as the main 
determinants of participation. This paper uses collective action theory to argue that key institutional 
changes and structural changes in labour markets were crucial to understand a significant part of the 
explosive popular mobilization of the period. We argue first that, before the second Republic, 
temporary migrants had been the main structural limitation against the stabilization of unions and 
collective bargaining in agricultural labour markets and in several service and industrial sectors. We 
then show how several industries underwent important structural changes since the late 1910s which 
stabilized part of the labour force and allowed for union growth and collective bargaining. In 
agricultural labour markets or in markets in which unskilled temporary workers could not be excluded, 
unions benefitted from republican legislation restricting temporary migrations and, as a consequence, 
rural unions saw large gains membership and participation. Historical narratives that focus on state 
repression or on changes in living standards to explain collective action and social conflict in Spain 
before the Civil War are incomplete without a consideration of the role of structural changes in labour 
markets from 1914 to 1931. 
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Introduction 
There is no doubt that 1930s Spain reached an unprecedented stage of social 
mobilization and political participation. Male universal suffrage had been in place 
since 1890 but electoral fraud and rigged elections were the norm for the whole 
Restoration (Restauración) period (1874-1923). Mass democracy, although with still 
too frequent problems of electoral manipulation and fraud, appeared however briefly 
during the Second Republic (1931-1936), with participation rates for the whole period 
(and that included female voters) between 65 and 70 per cent.1 Although active in 
many areas since the mid 19th century, trade unionism and other forms of social 
capital only made a decisive break in the early 20th century, despite the fact that 
unions and their activists frequently faced the repression of the state or the employers 
and, as a result, only rarely became mass movements (with the exception of the period 
1918-1920). In rural areas, where still the majority of population lived, movements of 
protest appeared occasionally where small proprietors were not the norm, especially 
among the landless peasants in Andalucía or the sharecroppers of Catalonia.2 
Repression however was much harsher than in the cities and these movements had an 
intense but otherwise short life. It was only in the 1930s that political participation, 
trade union membership, and strikes exploded in both rural and urban areas.  
 
The extent of working class mobilization was spectacular in comparative 
terms, especially if we take into account the level of development. The membership of 
the socialist General Workers’ Union (UGT) jumped from 228,500 members in 
December 1929 to 1,040,000 members in July 1932, a growth of 350%. The Anarcho-
                                                 
1
 Linz, Montero, Ruiz, ‘Elecciones’. 
2
 Carmona and Simpson, ‘Rabassa morta’. 
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Syndicalist National Confederation of Labour (CNT), banned during the Primo 
dictatorship, reached close to 800,000 workers at its peak.3 Trade union density 
doubled from about the previous peak of 13-14 % in 1920 to around 30  % in 1932, 
slightly above membership rates in Britain (25 %) or France (24%) and below the 
levels of Scandinavian countries (generally around 40 per cent of the gainfully 
employed).4  
 
Another proxy to the extent of mobilization, strike intensity, was among the 
highest in interwar Europe. The striker rate (mean of the yearly number of strikers in 
a given period divided by the gainfully employed) for the whole period 1931-1935 
was well above the European mean: 57 per 1000, almost doubling the rate of the 
second most strike prone country in the same period (Belgium). Peak striker rates in 
1932 and 1933 were considerable as well in Spain in comparison to other European 
countries in the interwar years. The peak level of mobilization in the interwar years 
corresponded to the year of the General Strike in Britain (1926), with 240 strikers per 
1,000 gainfully employed in 1926. Italy recorded 170 strikers per 1,000 employed in 
1920, whilst Spain reached 150 per 1,000 employed in 1933. After the elections of 
February 1936, Spain witnessed an even more intense round of strike activity and 
union growth that was however cut short by the start of the civil war on the 18th July 
of 1936.5  
 
                                                 
3
 Linz, Montero, Ruiz, ‘Elecciones’, p. 1328; Casanova, De la calle, p. 28. 
4
 Mann, ‘Sources’. Trade union density calculated as the proportion of unionized workers in the overall 
working population (including agricultural workers). The Spanish density figures are mine using the 
Spanish population census of 1930. 
5
 Non-Spanish striker rates calculated using data on strikes and gainfully employed from Mitchell, 
European statistics.  
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 There is no doubt that in Spain the unprecedented scale of working class 
mobilization alarmed the middle class commentators of the period. Some went so far 
as to consider that the Republic had degenerated into a political and social chaos that 
required an authoritarian solution. No one exemplifies better the ambivalent position 
of the middle class intelligentsia in the period than Gregorio Marañón, one of the 
leading intellectuals of the period. Initially a supporter of the 2nd Republic, he ended 
up justifying his support for the National uprising arguing that the Republic was 
dominated by the Moscow myth (“el mito moscovita”), referring to the proliferation 
of revolutionary ideals and the threat of a soviet-type revolution.6 Another leading 
intellectual of the 1930s, Salvador de Madariaga, wrote that by 1936  “the country has 
entered a plainly revolutionary phase. Neither life nor property were safe anywhere.”7  
 
Genuinely puzzled by the extent and characteristics of working class 
mobilization, middle-class commentators stressed the atavistic behaviours of ordinary 
working class Spaniards and their lack of political sophistication. Gerald Brenan, for 
example, quoted the great historian of rural unions and protest in Andalucía, Juan 
Díaz del Moral, speaking about the “naiveté of many Andalusian anarchists”, 
something he said he could confirm after talking to Andalusian peasants in 1936.8 
Similarly, George Orwell in Homage to Catalonia remarked that among Catalan and 
Aragonese workers “Christian belief was replaced to some extent by Anarchism, 
whose influence is widely spread and which undoubtedly has a religious tinge.”9 The 
eminent historian and anthropologist Julio Caro Baroja wrote about the “ (…) mass 
that overestimated its strength and thought the country was hers, with an absolute lack 
                                                 
6
 Quoted in Gracia, Resistencia, p. 76. 
7
 Payne, Collapse, p. 223. 
8
 Brenan, Spanish labyrinth, p. 198. 
9
 Orwell, Homage, p. 57. 
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of intuition (sic).”10 Historian and literary critic Juan Marichal explained how, when 
he was a boy after talking to a peasant in Extremadura in 1936 or 1937, he wondered 
whether he was the “usual messianic Spaniard.”11 The great Catalan journalist Agustí 
Calvet, “Gaziel”, writing in the period complained about the “furious madness of the 
masses” and the “myopia and insolvency of the Left.”12 
 
 Historians have generally been more careful in their characterization of the 
extent of working class mobilization during the Republic and the motives driving 
workers to join movements of protest. A perennial theme, however, is the increasing 
exasperation experienced by workers vis-à-vis the Republican state interpreted as a 
promising explanation of the visible increase of social conflict in the period. Manuel 
Tuñón de Lara stated “in April 1931 a general state of hope had been created with no 
base in reality, akin to a state of collective daydreaming.”13 These hopes, however, 
were not met by the government. Therefore, for instance, Paul Preston argued “the 
success of the right in blocking change would so exasperate the rural and urban 
working classes as to undermine their faith in parliamentary democracy.”14 In a 
similar vein, Helen Graham noted that, during the 2nd Republic that “the thwarting of 
popular aspirations in social change produced disillusion not only among the landless 
poor and unemployed of the rural south but also among worker constituencies in 
Spain.”15 Furthermore, in her book The Spanish Republic at War she wrote “worker 
dissatisfaction arrived quickly in metropolitan Spain –and most notably in the 
inustrial heartland of Barcelona. For many workers, their daily experience was 
                                                 
10
 Caro Baroja, Los Baroja, p. 241. 
11
 Marichal, Secreto, p. 265. 
12
 Quoted in Pericay, Cuatre històries, p. 702, p. 704. 
13
 Tuñón de Lara, Tres claves, p. 11. 
14
 Preston, Spanish civil war, p. 38. 
15
 Graham, Introduction, p. 14. 
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dominated by the absence (her emphasis) of palliative reform (for the Republic had 
promised it) alongside the brutality of what appeared to be a largely unreformed state 
apparatus in action.”16 Chris Ealham, in his comprehensive history of the evolution of 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Barcelona during the 1930s, wrote that by 1931: 
“the stage was set for confrontation between the CNT (National Confederation of 
Labour) and the authorities. Since the authorities were incapable of either 
promulgating reforms capable of placating grassroots demands or co-opting the most 
important community and working class leaders in Barcelona, they were obliged to 
confront the strike movement.”17 Similarly, greater participation and greater activism 
were caused by greater repression of the labour movement by the Republican 
government.  One of the leading historians of Spanish Anarcho-syndicalism, Julián 
Casanova, for example remarked how alreay in 1932 “it was very difficult to bring 
together a ‘repressive’ Republic and a ‘proletariat’ that was losing faith in 
democracy.”18  
 
Collective action 
This paper uses classic collective action theory to argue that the unprecedented wave 
of popular mobilization that took place during the 2nd Republic did not mainly reflect 
the widespread currency of revolutionary ideologies, or the lack of political 
sophistification of workers, or the increasing tensions of the working class with an 
allegedly repressive Republican state. We argue instead that key changes in labour 
markets and in institutions to an important extent “caused” the phenomenal increase 
in participation in the period.  
 
                                                 
16
 Graham, Spanish Republic, p. 35. 
17
 Ealham, Class, culture and conflict, p. 97. 
18
 Casanova, De la calle, p. 97.  
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Structural and institutional changes were particularly deep in rural labour 
markets and therefore rural workers mobilized to an unprecendented scale in the 
1930s. The mobilization of the landless peasants benefitted especially the General 
Workers’ Union (UGT). In the late 1920s, during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, 
the socialist union had reached out to almost 250’000 members, albeit with very 
limited penetration among the rural workers.19 In the early 1930s, the union made 
strategically decided to mobilize the landless peasants of the centre and south of Spain 
(who, especially in the South, had leaned towards the anarcho-syndicalists).  
 
No doubt, they had an outstanding success in doing so. From a total of around 
1’0000’000 dues-paying members, in 1932 the union had almost 400’000 affiliated 
workers in agriculture and in 1933 the number was roughly 450’000.20 Furthermore, 
the increase in strike activity crucially depended on the strikes of rural workers, most 
of them affiliates of the socialist union. In 1930, rural workers’ strikers represented 
about 7 % of all strikers in Spain, but by 1932 slightly more than a third of strikers 
were organized by rural workers.21 
  
The starting point of our theoretical argument is the definition of unions as 
institutions that aggregate the preferences of their members for especially working 
conditions and wages.22 Unions might care for other broader political objectives: 
more labour friendly laws, a more democratic polity, or a particular line in foreign 
policy (for example, support or opposition to a foreign war), but this does not alter the 
                                                 
19
 Linz, Montero, Ruiz, ‘Elecciones’, p. 1138. 
20
 Malefakis, Agrarian reform, p. 290; Bizcarrondo, UGT, p. 19. 
21
 Anuario Estadístico de España, years 1931, 1932-1933. 
22
 Freeman and Madoff, What do unions do?, pp. 9-10. 
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insight that the main task of unions is to bargain the working conditions of their 
members with the employers and the state.  
 
According to the literature, the aggregation of individual preferences ends up 
identifying the collective preference with the preferences of the ‘average’ worker. In 
most cases, the ‘average’ worker generally corresponds to an experienced worker, 
who has invested some time in accumulating firm- and sector-specific skills.23 These 
“average” preferences contrast with the preferences of the “marginal” worker, the one 
who leaves or stays depending on small changes in working conditions in the firm and 
in the outside labour market. The young, mobile only maximizes current productivity 
and earnings, not productivity during her whole life cycle. As a result, the ‘marginal’ 
worker prefers piece rates instead of time rates, does not mind to work long hours to 
maximize income, and has a weaker preference for a safe and healthy work 
enviroment. In contrast, workers who are fully committed to long-term employment 
in the sector or the firm prefer shorter hours and time rates, to protect future 
productivity and earnings.  
 
In this simplified setting, there might be situations in which unions find it 
impossible to reconcile the preferences of very different types of workers.24 This is 
especially the case when a significant majority of workers have short-term 
attachements to their jobs and the interests of mobile workers clash with the interest 
of more permanent workers. In this situation, the union is very unstable, low levels of 
membership prevail, and strikebreakers take the jobs of strikers. This problem, as we 
show below, was especially acute in Spain because temporary migrants, generally 
                                                 
23
 Freeman and Madoff, What do unions do?, pp. 9-10. 
24
 Shiells, ‘Collective choice’. 
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with migrations shorter than a year and in general only some months in the year, were 
an almost perennial characteristic of Spanish labour markets until the 1960s.   
 
The idea that social movements and unions in particular supply public goods 
to their members is another well-known insight of collective action.25 Because the 
final result of collective action is a public good (i.e. everybody gets the same amount 
of the good irrespective of his or her individual participation), the almost inevitable 
outcome is that unions have low levels of membership and strikes generally fail to 
attract enough workers (who prefer to stay at home or occasionally cross the picket 
line). Traditionally, unions have sorted this free-rider problem in two ways. Unions 
might offer private benefits to their members (generally insurance) to attract 
membership.26 Additionally, or alternatively, they can look for ways to make 
membership more or less compulsory by artificially increasing the private costs of 
free-riding the collective effort, for example by deterring strikebreakers with picket 
lines, enforcing social norms that ostracize strikebreakers, or, the strongest deterrent 
to free riders, restricting employment exclusively to those who belong to the union 
(the closed shop).  
 
 Following insights from collective action theory, our hypothesis is that one of 
the main drivers of the unprecedented mobilization was the severe disruption of the 
traditional pattern of temporary migrations that took place in the 1930s. There were 
several reasons for this. Firstly, the Republican state instituted legal impediments to 
the moves of temporary migrants. Secondly, several sectors like mining or textiles 
experienced structural changes in their demand for labour. Finally, a law of 
                                                 
25
 Olson, Logic, pp. 70-71. 
26
 Boyer, ‘Unions’; Van Leeuwen, ‘Trade unions’. 
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employment (ley de ocupación obrera) handed to unions the power to control the 
local censuses of workers, which were used to establish who was the first to take a 
job. In fact, this control was very close to establish a de facto closed shop.  
 
In order to proceed to defend our hypothesis, we follow the following steps. 
First, we discuss the existence of temporary migrations, a point already established by 
economic historian Javier Silvestre, and the data problems and provide evidence of 
conflicts between temporary and permanent (or mobile and long-term) workers in 
several important sectors of the Spanish economy before the 1930s.27 We then argue 
that important legal changes like the law of municipal boundaries of 1931 (which 
gave absolute priority to local over non-local workers in access to jobs) radically 
altered the behaviour of temporary migrations, increasing the bargaining power of 
local workers in rural labour markets. We then discuss the main issues of contention 
in both urban and rural labour markets in the 1930s. Our argument to a great extent 
depends on detecting differences in the organization of unions and labour markets 
between rural and industrial sectors. Among the latter, we also discuss differences 
between sectors in which the competition of temporary migrants was important and 
skill-intensive sectors in which this competition did not exist. In our analysis, we find 
conflicts about who could be employed were more typical of rural labour markets or 
in sectors in which the entry of unskilled, temporary workers could not be effectively 
restricted. In skilled sectors, the control of new entrants via training periods and an 
earlier stabilization of the union reduced the importance of the closed shop.  
  
 
                                                 
27
 Silvestre, ‘Temporary migrations’. 
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Temporary migrations and collective bargaining 
Before the 1960s, the process of industrialization in Spain suffered from a 
characteristically slow structural change.28 The slow pace of structural change was not 
caused by failures in labour markets since Spanish labour markets were apparently 
well integrated.29 Economic historians generally agree that, with the exception of the 
1920s, it was the pull factor of cities that faltered, meaning that the pattern of 
industrialization was too slow to attract permanent migrants from the underemployed 
rural population.  
 
Although permanent migration was slow until the 1920s, Javier Silvestre 
(2007) uncovered the existence of an important pattern of temporary migrations and 
discussed its implications for the process of industrialization and labour market 
integration. Like in France, Spain was characterized by the persistence of temporary 
migrations, which depended on the seasonal pattern of labour demand in agriculture.30  
Contrary to a long working year in Northern Europe of about 300 days, in many areas 
of Spain, landless labourers or small propietors only could work for a maximum of 
180 to 200 days per year (unless they had a permanent attachment to a farm), looking 
for alternative employment elsewhere during the slack season.31 A great proportion of 
this temporary rural workers looked for employment opportunities in the succesive 
harvesting seasons of cereal (Summer), vines (Autumn) and olives (Winter), but in 
many cases also found employment in urban sectors for some periods of time in the 
year –the most notorious case probably being mining- but also in textiles, services, 
                                                 
28
 Prados de la Escosura, El progreso. 
29
 Simpson, ‘Real wages’; Rosés and Sánchez Alonso, ‘Regional wage convergence’. 
30
 Magnac and Postel-Vinay, ‘Wage competition’. 
31
 Simpson, ‘Real wages’; Simpson, ‘Labour markets’; Silvestre, ‘Temporary migrations’. 
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and construction.32 Some of the these migrations were quite different in terms of the 
length of the period spent away from home: agricultural migrations generally had 
spells well below a year, generally a few months or even weeks, whereas migrations 
to urban areas probably represented a far more prolonged period of time away from 
home (more on this below). 
 
 Despite the obvious interest of this phenomenon, by its very nature, 
unavoidable data problems make it difficult to gauge the extent of temporary 
migrations in Spain. Javier Silvestre (2007) is to date the best attempt to deal with the 
phenomenon quantitatively using the population censuses, although he openly 
acknowledges the limitations of the exercise.33 Since census enumerators visited 
households at the end of the census year, many temporary migrations, especially those 
in which the migration spell was short and did not take place at the end of the year, 
were not visible in the census. Using the category of transeúntes (temporary migrants) 
in the population totals by each Spanish province (the main administrative unit of the 
Spanish state), Silvestre uncovers temporary out-migration rates of between 3.5 and 
5.5 per cent of the total population.34  
 
 Based on his careful calculation, Silvestre estimates the number of temporary 
migrants fluctuated between 690’000 to 1’000’000 workers at its peak in 1930, which 
would represent somewhere between 11 to 16 per cent of the gainfully employed 
(estimates of the gainfully employed in 1930 depending on the definition chosen 
                                                 
32
 Silvestre, ‘Temporary migrations’; Domenech, ‘Labour market adjustment’; Domenech and Elu, 
‘Women’s paid work’; Ferrer-Alós, ‘Notas’; Sarasúa, ‘Living home’. 
33
 Silvestre, ‘Temporary migrations’, p. 548. 
34
 Silvestre, ‘Temporary migrations’, p. 549. 
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cluster between 6.5 million to 7 million).35 However, Silvestre’s estimates need 
necessarily to be taken as lower bound estimates, since many intra-provincial 
migrations and migration spells of less than a year not taking place at the end of the 
year would be invisible in the censuses. Therefore the proportion of the phenomenon 
must have been larger than the benchmark estimates Silvestre provides. 
 
 According to collective action theory, if temporary migrations were so 
widespread, it must have been difficult for unions to reconcile the preferences of 
temporary and permanent workers. As we show below, the history of labour markets 
in Spain shows how, in fact, permanent workers clashed frequently with temporary 
migrants.  
 
A typical example is mining. Despite the fact that large firms dug coal in 
Asturias (north of Spain) since the mid 19th century, the Asturian Miners’ Union was 
not founded until 1910 and union was not recognized by employers until 1912. Since 
the coal mining establishments employed a combination of permanent and transitory 
workers, the inability to organize collective action by the coal miners of Asturias is 
not surprising. Firstly, there was a seasonal supply of miners who were farmers and 
peasants underemployed in winter (the “obrero mixto” in the literature).36 Secondly, 
mines employed temporary migrants from other regions: from León, Navarra, 
Aragón, Biscay and especially from Galicia. There were several conflicts between the 
permanent and the temporary workers. This was especially the case of immigrants 
from Galicia. Characteristically, Adrian Shubert mentions a case of a violent clash 
between socialist workers and migrants from Galicia in one of the largest mining 
                                                 
35
 Population census, 1930. 
36
 Ruiz, Octubre 1934; Shubert, Hacia la Revolución; Sierra Álvarez, El obrero soñado. 
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establishments.37 Mistrust and hostility ran so deep, that as late as 1919 when the 
organization of workers from Galicia (Centro Gallego) petitioned for membership in 
the socialist union, the union refused. Songs of the revolutionaries of 1934 waxed 
lyrical about an Asturias free of the “Galician troops”, referring to the armies of 
temporary migrants from Galicia that found employment in the mines.38 With such a 
fragmented labour force and with a ready source of strikebreakers, employers did not 
have to recognize the union until World War I, when the conditions for the demand 
for coal were exceptional. 
 
The labour market in the iron ore mines of Biscay was similar. A government 
report published in 1904 on the working conditions of the mines in Biscay (North of 
Spain) noted: “one of the most remarkable characteristics of the mining population in 
Biscay is the division between permanent (“fijo”) and temporary (“ambulante”) 
workers.” According to the same report, about a 70 per cent of miners were employed 
on a temporary basis.39 Most of them migrated from the provinces of Galicia and the 
North of Castilla to be employed for a limited number of years or during the slack 
season in winter.40 For instance, one of the managers (Mr. Woolf) of the “Orconera 
Iron Ore Company Limited” recognised the costs of employing transient workers 
“who stay in our mines one, two or three years, most of them only for some months.” 
The ambulante was “reluctant to unionise because (…),” it was said, “he believes his 
ties with mining work are temporary.” 41 Generally, union membership in the sector 
rarely surpassed ten per cent of the labour force. Additionally, the ambulante also 
                                                 
37
 Shubert, Hacia la revolución, p. 83. 
38
 Shubert, Hacia la revolución, p. 84, footnote 18. 
39
 Instituto de Reformas Sociales (from now on, IRS), Minas de Vizcaya, p. 187. 
40
 A colourful depiction of the life in the mines of Vizcaya which puts emphasis on the rivalries created 
by the different regional origins of miners (quoting songs for example) is given in Ibárruri, Único 
camino, pp. 15-20. 
41
 IRS, Minas de Vizcaya, p. 189. 
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accepted barrack housing, credit in the company store, being paid by the month rather 
than the week, and longer hours to maximise pay.   
 
The relationships between these “fijos” and “ambulantes” were undoubtedly 
tense.42 During strikes, strikers regularly clashed with temporary workers who did not 
support the strike.43 The traditional demands of the Biscay mining unions had been 
the abolition of barrack housing and the truck system, the setting of a regular pattern 
of hours of work based on winter hours, and the abrogation of tareas (the payment on 
the basis of individual or group output). However, employers refused to deal with the 
union because they argued it did not represent all workers. In this context, working 
conditions were by and large determined by the preferences of the transient workers: 
long hours in summer, payment by the piece, and barrack housing. When government 
officials asked some Biscayan workers which system of payment they preferred, a 
group of miners answered: “This you have to ask to the ambulantes.”44 
 
Large cities with large service sectors provided good opportunities for 
temporary migrants. For example, French sociologist Jacques Valdour noted in 1919 
that in the case of the Catalan urban centres: “les nombreux ouvriers qui arrivent des 
autres provinces d’Espagne s’emploient comme manoeuvres dans les diverses 
fabriques et usines: ils ne se fondent pas dans la population, n’en apprenent pas la 
langue, et généralement après six mois, un our deux ans, retournent chez eux avec 
quelque argent gagné.”45 In addition, housemaids and domestic service work were a 
                                                 
42
 Ibárruri, Único camino, p. 17. 
43
 Fusi, Política obrera, p. 268. 
44
 IRS, Minas de Vizcaya, p. 188. 
45
 Valdour, Ouvrier espagnol, volume I, p. 78.  
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traditional market for young women.46 Adolescent mobile work was also predominant 
among sales workers or waiters. The data provided by labour inspectors in the city of 
Madrid on the ages of waiters in the taverns of Madrid shows how the age distribution 
was skewed toward younger than average workers: about 40 per cent were younger 
than 18.47 Evidence also suggests that these were “blind alley occupations”: jobs 
occupied by adolescents in big cities not requiring an initial set of skills and providing 
little on-the-job training. As a result, sales workers had flat earnings profiles as their 
earnings had little chances to increase after reaching twenty-five years of age. For 
example, in the agreements signed by the members of the Barcelona joint commission 
of sales workers and patrons in 1918-1919, minimum wages were stipulated to 
increase with each year of service for 14 to 24 years olds, but not after this age.48 
 
In addition, their employment package of many service workers was 
substantially different from the one prevailing in industry or the trades. Most sales 
workers were internos, meaning they lodged and ate at their patron’s house, generally 
in the same establishment. In the taverns of Madrid, this arrangement covered 90 per 
cent of workers and all qualitative evidence points to the fact that internado was the 
rule.49 A 1914 government report stated that, as a rule, commercial workers were paid 
by the year or even had to wait until the termination of their employment at the 
establishment to be paid at all.50 Moreover, because workers needed lodgings and 
food, the practice of the internado suggests that in big cities sales workers were 
recruited from nearby provinces and not from the city. Again in the cases of the 
taverns of Madrid, the labour inspectors remarked “the interno is very unstable and 
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changes frequently when there are no family ties with the patron,” and added “he (the 
interno) is hired from all the provinces of Spain, but preferably from these 
neighbouring Madrid.”51 
 
Therefore, the sector characteristically employed workers operating a regional 
labour market for unskilled, adolescent work. In the case of interno workers, 
employment spells were short. This labour market offered little prospects for workers 
after the age of marriage. Again, the collective action problem appears with weak 
trade unions and in the conflict between these workers willing to invest in the 
improvement of working conditions in the sector and these planning to shift to other 
occupations or return to their towns of origin. As a result, the unions of sales workers 
took longer to develop fully. The Catalan CADCI (Centre Autonomista de 
Dependents de Comerç i de la Indústria), for example, did not start serious campaigns 
to abolish Sunday work or the internado until 1912 and membership only started to 
grow in the late 1910s.52 
 
However, it was in rural labour markets where conflicts between temporary 
and permanent workers became more salient. For example, in the cereal area of 
Andalusia, local rural workers faced competition from forasteros, temporary migrants 
from generally poorer regions (from Extremadura, Portugal or the Western 
Andalusian provinces).53 These migrant workers preferred to maximize productivity, 
reduce the time it took to collect the harvest and be paid according to output, 
exploiting the small differences of harvest times in different towns. Employers, on the 
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other hand, paid piece rates that effectively dealt with the problem of monitoring 
workers’ effort. With low labour costs, mechanization was not profitable and therfore 
harvesting continued to be done by human labour only.54  In contrast, local workers 
had the exact opposite set of incentives. They preferred to maximize the number of 
days that they were employed (because the working year was so short), to be paid a 
time rate rather than a piece rate and to work shorter hours rather than de sol a sol 
(from sunrise to sunset); local workers were viscerally opposed to the recruitment of 
forasteros.55  
 
The clash of preferences between local workers and “agosteros” (temporary 
workers employed in the harvest jobs) appeared in with special intensity in the wave 
of strikes that swept the cereal-growing towns of Central Andalucía in 1918-1919. 
Despite the efforts of unions to mitigate competition of temporary migrants 
(forasteros), unions only rarely succeeded in enforcing a collective contract and 
banning the employment of non-locals. Juan Díaz del Moral gave detailed evidence 
that the use of boycotts to ostracize forastero workers who were not affiliated with the 
union became very effective only in 1919, although the practice declined thereafter.56 
Because harvest jobs were labour-intensive and required few skills, employers saw 
little benefit in cooperating with local workers; thus, they tended to oppose unions 
and continued contracting gangs of temporary workers. The abundance of cheap 
labour made mechanization unprofitable. Reflecting the traditional dislike for 
temporary migrants, the harvesters of Castro del Río, in Córdoba, drew up a 
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characteristic collective contract in 1919 that demanded above all the banning of 
piece rates and the preferential hiring of local workers over non-locals.57  
 
Early 20th century reports also give further information of clashes between 
temporary migrants and local workers in other rural labour markets. A survey of 
working conditions and contract in the rice-growing area of Valencia in 1916 argued 
that the local supply of workers was not enough in the harvest time during the late 
summer and early autumn.58 Rice needs to be harvested quickly to minimize the risks 
of the potential damages caused by storms, which are frequent in the area at that time 
of the year.59 Wages contracted on a daily basis and long hours were the norm. In 
some cases, his estimates of local needs of temporary workers in the range of 50 to 75 
per cent of the total number of workers employed. Similar peaks of labour needs can 
also be found in fruit-picking campaigns in the same area.60 
 
In contrast with the previous cases, working class cohesion was strongest in 
cities and heavily industrialized areas of the North and North-East, where in skill-
intensive sectors, workers had a long tradition of collective action with well-enforced 
social norms guaranteeing high participation (collective violence against 
strikebreakers being the most typical one). More importantly, unions’ control over the 
process of skill-building and the subsequent slow penetration of recent migrants in 
skill-intensive sectors generally gave unions the upper hand in the market. There were 
some important exceptions to this pattern; in the construction industry or in the 
traditional service occupations, like waiters or shop assistants, permanent workers 
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faced the competition of temporary workers. Unless unions were openly repressed, 
urban labour markets displayed a spontaneous tendency towards the collective 
organization and standardization of working conditions (via collective contracts) and 
the more or less explicit recognition of unions.  
 
It is easy to find many early examples of collective contracts and autonomous 
organization in skill-intensive sectors since the 1840s. Genís Barnosell, for example, 
mentions the agreements on piece rates for weaver and spinners in Barcelona in 1841 
and the formalization of some collective bargaining via the first joint board of 
employers and workers.61 Collective contracts existed in many cities for the printing 
industry, barrel-making and in many artisanal jobs in the early 20th century. In the 
case of Barcelona, Miguel Sastre compiled several collective contracts for several 
groups of workers striking in the very early 20th century. Among others, only in 1903 
for example he reported the very detailed local collective contracts of cartwrights, 
carpenters, construction workers, hatters, bakers, shoemakers, sawyers, foundry 
workers, printers, bookbinders, or stone cutters.62 
 
 
Industrial markets 
In the case of labour markets in skill-intensive industrial sectors, most union 
mobilization in the 1930s did not depend on coercive instruments or on compulsory 
membership (like the closed shop). We show below how in fact entry restrictions (“el 
turno”) was not in fact a predominant demand of those sectors. However, in some 
industries that provided entry jobs for temporary migrants the situation was not as 
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peaceful. Chris Ealham notes that one of the most common grievances of anarcho-
syndicalist unions in 1931 Barcelona was the recognition of labour exchanges 
controlled by the anarcho-syndicalist CNT (National Confederation of Labour).63 This 
type of demand was especially salient among workers in the fields of dock work and 
building construction, where competition from new (unskilled) entrants would have 
been particularly intense. Eulàlia Vega writes that one of the main demands of an 
early November 1930 strike by carpenters (ramo de la madera) in the city of València 
was for the organization of a labour exchange controlled by the union. She also 
stresses that, as this was not met by employers, it became a source of constant conflict 
during the 1930s in the construction sector.64 In his detailed study of social conflicts 
in the building industry in Madrid between 1931 and 1934, Santos Juliá notes that 
rival anarcho-syndicalist and Catholic unions complained about the fact that to find a 
job in Madrid’s construction sector, it was necessary to belong to the General 
Workers’ Union -UGT.65 In a similar vein, in the service sector, several measures 
were taken to reduce the competition in entry-level jobs. There was a general trend 
toward forbidding internado, young temporary migrants’ practice of sleeping and 
eating in the same shop that employed them, which in fact eliminated the competition 
from young temporary migrants. The worker’s minimum age was increased from 14 
to 16. In many cases, several limitations on the employment of women were 
enforced.66   
 
Attempts to limit access to jobs in the construction industry (or among 
dockers) contrast with the situation in the textile industry in Catalonia, for example. 
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Although the anarcho-syndicalist union of the cotton textile workers explicitly 
campaigned for the closed shop in 1931, the issue did not seem to attract a lot of 
attention in the period. Electrification in the 1920s, which stabilized labour demand 
throughout the year, probably reconciled the preferences of workers employed in 
urban factories (which had a fairly constant demand for labour throughout the year) 
and with those in isolated, water-powered factories (which used to close down in the 
summer due to the summer draught and used temporary workers).67 After massive 
general strikes, collective contracting for the entire Catalonian cotton textile sector 
had failed in 1890 and again in 1913.68 In 1931, a new collective contract was drawn 
up for the so-called “Mountain” area (of water-powered company towns) that 
approximated working conditions to those prevalent in the urban factories. The main 
issues bargained for by the union in 1931 were related to the length of the working 
day, the distributional impact of the motherhood subsidy (since the sector was a 
traditional employer of women), one-week paid holidays and short time; union 
demands made no reference to the closed shop.69 By stabilizing labour demand 
throughout the year, electrification made possible the reconciliation of the preferences 
of hitherto heterogenous types of workers. In the 1930s, regional collective 
contracting became possible in the Catalan cotton textile sector. 
 
Similarly, in skilled sectors in which it was easy to restrict entry and in which 
unions were easily stabilized, union recognition appeared almost spontaneously, and 
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collective bargaining was the natural outcome of the legalization of unions in 1930. In 
fact, there is very little evidence that in industrial sectors the closed shop was 
important, barely appearing in the mass of collective contracts signed in the period. 
We have collected 357 provincial and local collective contracts in industrial sectors 
(excluding the garment industry) using Mariano González-Rothvoss’ compilation of 
collective contracts published in 1935. Among other things, the contracts have very 
detailed clauses clauses stipulating wages for all occupations, hours of work, fringe 
benefits and imposing restrictions on lay offs. However, only 3% openly established 
the closed shop.70 
 
 Furthermore, the evidence from employers’ associations in industrial sectors 
does not suggest there were significant conflicts over the closed shop or the union’s 
control over new entrants. The state sponsored labour exchanges, and local lists of 
employed and unemployed workers were drawn up. This undertaking was organized 
by the main corporatist institution of the period, the local board of conciliation, the 
jurado mixto. In many cases, collective contracts stipulated that the jurado mixto was 
to draw and organize the list, which enabled unions to control the flow of entrants into 
their sector and to demand membership and participation in exchange for access to 
jobs. About half of the collective contracts we have surveyed explicitly forced 
employers to contract only from the local census or labour exchange (179 out of 357), 
but there is little evidence that employers were overtly troubled by this. According to 
Mercedes Cabrera’s extensive survey of employers’ lobbying in the 1930s, contrary 
to the employers in the rural sector as we show below, the control by unions over the 
hiring of workers does not appear as an important issue for employers in industrial 
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sectors. Rather, employers’ associations protested against the way jurados mixtos 
were organized. As the boards contained six employer representatives and six worker 
representatives, most voting decisions were, in fact, decided by the vote of the 
president of the jurado, who tended to be elected by the Ministry of Labour because 
employers and workers almost never agreed on who was to be the president. Taking 
data for 1932 only, in conciliation settlements, the jurados favored the worker or 
group of workers in about 70% of the cases in the provinces of Madrid (4844 times 
out of 6860) and Barcelona (1535 out of 2200).71 To a great extent, employers felt 
that because conciliation – almost invariably favorable to workers – was imposed on 
them, they did not have any legal buffer against the drawing up of yet another 
collective contract with higher wages and shorter hours.72 
 
Coal miners in Asturias represent perhaps the most challenging example to 
explain with our hypothesis given the enormous qualitative and quantitative change in 
the nature of collective action. As we mentioned above, the Sindicato Minero 
Asturiano (SMA, Asturian Miners’ Union) was not recognized by the employers until 
1912, which was hardly surprising giving the predominance of seasonal workers and 
temporary migrants. In sharp contrast, in the 1930s, coal miners in the province of 
Oviedo hade become without any doubt the most cohesive social movement in Spain. 
In October 1934, the coal miners of Asturias were to stage a full-blown 2-weeks long 
rebellion in which all the mining towns were seized up by the miners and the capital 
of the province was taken by a militia of workers. In 1932 and 1933, the province of 
Oviedo (Asturias) scored the highest striker rate in the country by a large margin 
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(more than 300 per 1000 workers in 1932 and 1933, probably the highest striker rate 
in any region in interwar Europe). Union densities stood at levels close to 70 per cent. 
In 1933, La Felguera (18’000 inhabitants) withstood a general strike of 9 months. 
There were 32 strikes in the first 9 months of 1934, three of them general strikes 
lasting various weeks.73 For obvious reasons, their collective contract did not bother 
to enforce the closed shop and did not establish the obligatory use of the labour 
exchange.74  
 
Altthough one can argue about the impact of the decline of coal prices and the 
concomitant erosion of miners’ working conditions and living standards, the fact is 
that the labour market for miners changed dramatically from 1914 to 1920, increasing 
the proportion of workers committed to long-term employment in mining. Large 
changes in the international market for coal fundamentally altered the relative wages 
and employment prospects of miners. In 1912, a long strike of British miners opened 
up new markets for the expensive and generally low quality Asturian coal and after a 
strike the owners were forced to recognize the Asturian Miners’ Union (Sindicato 
Minero Asturiano). In 1914 and 1918, spectacular shortages in coal markets caused 
prices and later ouptut to go up, along with employment and wages. Employment 
grew 5-fold between 1910 and 1920, from slightly fewer than 6’000 workers in 
Oviedo employed in mines and quarries in 1900 and 1910 to almost 30’000 in 1920.75 
In this process, real wages grew more than 50 per cent.76 Changes in relative wages 
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and employment prospects must have meant that the labour force became more 
committed to long-term employment than in the pre-war years. 
 
After the unprecedented expenasion, the prospects of the industry turned 
upside down in the postwar years. Uncompetitive in most foreign markets, the coal 
industry had now a serious problem of excess capacity. The size of the adjustment 
was severe: coal prices fell by around 70 per cent from the 1918 peak, around a third 
of jobs were lost and miners experienced large nominal wage cuts in 1921 and 1923 
(which were however somehow mitigated by deflation). Rather than revolutionary, in 
1920s the strategy of the union was seriously pragmatic. The immediate political 
objective was securing tariff protection and a privileged position in domestic markets, 
two objectives that were close to the interests of their employers. However, the 
medium- to long-run objective was the nationalization of the mines, a change in 
property rights that surely would not please the mine owners.  In the late 1920s, the 
most moderate demands of miners (and also of mine owners) were met and the 
regime granted special privileges to coal producers like tariff protection and the 
compulsory consumption of coal in several sectors of the economy like the navy or 
railways. 77 
 
By 1930, the coal mines of Asturias still employed about 20’000 workers. The 
sector had been granted several privileges but the serious problem of excess capacity 
remained. In the 1930s, employers tried to cut wages, but short-time and lay offs were 
the main source of adjustment in the sector. The industry became the most strike-
prone by a large margin during the Second Republic. The pragmatic behaviour of the 
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Asturian coal miners’ union in the 1920s did not anticipate the revolutionary 
explosion of 1934, but the intensity of conflict in the early 1930s were certainly a 
precedent. It is beyond the aims of this article to explain the causes of the Asturias 
October revolution of 1934. Suffice to say for our purposes that in the 1930s Asturian 
miners clearly formed the most cohesive, disciplined group of workers in Spain, 
exemplifying the type of group described by revolution specialist Jack Goldstone 
when he writes:  
 
“studies of revolution and rebellion have shown that it is often not the groups that 
were just beginning to enjoy institutionalized political access, but these groups that 
had made considerable gains in institutional power and then were suddenly excluded, 
or that had acquired considerable economic power and felt entitled to a greater 
political role, that produced the most violently or revolutionary mobilization.”78  
 
 
Rural markets: 
In rural labour markets, 1931 marked a watershed. In a labour market with low 
barriers to entry (for example, no specialized skills were needed for harvest work) and 
a weak tradition of collective action, union control on entry was a priority to 
guarantee that workers would not have a strong incentive to contract individually and 
break strikes. In 1931, two legislative changes altered the functioning of rural labour 
markets in fundamental ways and gave unions greater control over who would get the 
scarce jobs available. The Law of Municipal Boundaries  (ley de términos 
municipales, finally derogated in May of 1934) forbade the recruitment of transient 
migrants and workers from other towns if there were local unemployed workers. 
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Moreover, via the Worker Employment Law of October 1931 (ley de ocupación 
obrera), the local conciliation board organized the list of employable workers and 
established priority in accessing agricultural jobs. In 1933, an anti-vagrancy law (Ley 
de Vagos y Maleantes) made it ever more difficult to move around the country in 
search of temporary employment. 
 
 An important caveat here is that the law of municipal boundaries suffered 
several changes until it was finally derogated in May 1934. For example, the prefect 
of the province of Córdoba, in Andalucía, allowed for some mobility in the province 
in the olive-picking campaign in the winter of 1932 establishing three zones in which 
mobility was complete (a husbandry, cereal and olive-growing zone).79 Similarly, 
several exceptions to the law were established in Extremadura.  A decree of 
September 1931 allowed for a relaxation of the municipal boundary in the cases of the 
grape and olive harvests and this was allowed especially in these cases in which a 
town with a low labour to land ratio neighboured one with a higher labour to land 
ratio.80 In 1932, like in Córdoba, several areas consisting of several towns were 
created in which mobility was allowed, and later on in 1933, full labour mobility was 
granted in the two provinces of Extremadura (separately).81 These changes suggest 
legislation was flexible enough to respond to local shortages of labour during harvest 
time, however they still point at a severe limitation of at least the interprovincial 
movements of temporary migrants. 
 
The empirical question then is to what extent were the temporary migrations 
disrupted as a result of institutional changes? The population census does not help us 
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here. The 1930 census was taken before the law was passed, and the next censuses 
were taken in 1940, when the law had been abrogated and independent unions were 
not legal. Therefore, censuses would not capture any temporary (but fundamental) 
break in the 1930s. In order to uncover the behaviour of temporary migrations and 
rural unions in the 1930s, we have to turn to the qualitative evidence. Reading the 
qualitative evidence is far from obvious. For example, there are thousands of towns 
and cities in the latifundia regions of Spain and the qualitative evidence we are 
presenting here mentions only some towns. Obviously, one wants to avoid biases 
based on prior beliefs and since we are sustaining the hypothesis that temporary 
migrations declined significantly in the 1930s, we will have a natural tendency to 
downplay cases in which temporary migrants worked instead of local workers. We 
will first present the most general statements we have found in th literature and 
newspapers about the relationships between temporary and local workers which 
inevitably point at the inability of temporary migrants in most regions to finds jobs 
outside their towns of origin. Then, we will show there were several conflicts between 
local and temporary workers. We finally present real wage evidence showing the 
bargaining power of workers was high in the 1930s, as it was in the period 1918-
1919. 
 
The qualitative evidence we have on the functioning of rural labour markets 
suggests temporary workers had a much harder time finding employment during the 
peaks of labour demand. Jerome Mintz quoted the testimony of a worker in Casas 
Viejas (Cádiz), who speaking mainly about the situation in 1931: “When the eight-
hour day came in, contract labour (meaning individual contracting) was wiped out. 
But some always worked by contract out of selfishness. The worker, through 
 30
ignorance or selfishness, did not respect the rights of his fellow workers.”82 Similarly, 
another of his interviewees manifested, “under the eight-hour work rule, contract 
labour was greatly reduced, although some landowners anxious for a rapid harvest 
and some workers eager for a quick profit continued to perpetuate the system.”83  
 
Despite the similar cases in which temporary workers were employed, in 
Andalucía, the evidence points at severe restrictions in the mobility of workers. In 
July 1931, an MP from Málaga wrote to a letter to the president of the Republic 
complaining that the province of Málaga had about 40’000 unemployed workers who 
could not find work in Granada or Sevilla, as they traditionall did in periods of peak 
labour demand.84 In Carmona (Sevilla), as well in 1931, when sugarbeet producers 
told the prefect of the province they wanted to keep their specialised, forastero 
workers, the prefect answered that he could not authorise the employment of non-
locals if there were local unemployed workers.85 The prefect of Córdoba manifested 
local workers had absolute priority and ordered the gangs of temporary workers to go 
back to their towns, if needed with the help of the Guardia Civil (state police).86 In 
June 1932, the prefect of Jaén announced some complaints about the employment of 
non-locals had reached him and that he was going to be inflexible with the 
landowners in those cases in which they were unemployed local workers.87 In July 
1932, the prefect of Salamanca said he was levying fines to several employers who 
were not employing local unemployed workers and were hiring forasteros instead.88 
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In 1933, the prefect of Cádiz jailed “several employers” who were employing 
Portuguese workers.89 
 
In Extremadura, Sergio Riesco uncovered several protests of mayors 
complaining to the ministry of Interior that workers could not find work in other 
towns. In the case of Cañaveral (Cáceres), the mayor complained about how spread 
unemployment was and how workers in the town could not find employment 
anywhere else. Riesco also reports other cases from Albalá and San Vicente de 
Alcántara in the same province.90  
 
Very significant is the testimony of a rural landowner from Castilla León (not 
specifying the town, nor the province) which appeared in June 1934 (during the rural 
workers’ general strike) in the newspaper El Sol arguing that in 1933 (a year of a poor 
harvest) the surplus of local workers had not dared to look for employment elsewhere 
during harvest time and that in 1934 (a year of an exceptionally good harvest) he was 
not confident they could get temporary migrants to harvest the wheat quickly.91 In a 
famous strike in the province of Salamanca in 1933, the union denounced employers 
did not honour the turno and did not employ workers from the local census of 
workers. The state stepped in to disband the gangs of workers contracted by 
employers and enforce the turno. A lock-out ensued, in which rural employers 
insisted on free contracting. The General Workers’ Union (UGT) decided to call for a 
general strike of rural workers in the province. Finally, an agreement was reached, 
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stipulating that the civil governor and the Ministry of Labour delegate of the province 
would draw and organize the list of eligible workers.92 
 
Similarly, Fernando del Rey reports several conflicts between locals and 
forasteros in the province of Ciudad Real, especially as forastero workers from other 
provinces were not allowed to work in the grape-picking campaign of the Valdepeñas 
and Manzanares areas. Similarly, he mentions how in Miguelturra (Ciudad Real), 
workers who generally worked in the fields of Ciudad Real remained unemployed 
staging a violent general strike in July 1931.93  
 
Conflicts between temporary forasteros and local workers abound in the 
1930s. The great writer Miguel de Unamuno complained bitterly in 1932 about the 
level of conflict between workers in different towns, between those who were 
accepted into the lists of the local exchanges and those excluded and the enormous 
power wielded by those who made the lists.94 These conflicts were particularly 
extreme during strikes during the harvest season. In July 1931, in Baena (Jaén), rural 
workers won a strike against the non-local workers employed in the town.95 In the 
same month, workers in Utrera (Sevilla) threatened that they would go to a general 
strike if forastero workers were not evicted from the town.96 Or a group of workers 
from La Rinconada (Sevilla) visited the prefect so that the conditions stipulated in the 
collective contract would be guaranteed, most especially the restrictions on the hiring 
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of non-local workers.97 In Casas Viejas (Cádiz), where peasants and the Civil Guard 
tragically clashed in 1933, local workers went on strike in May 1932 to oppose the 
contracting of Portuguese labourers for the harvest. In June 1932, another strike 
occurred because landowners did not comply with the collective contract and hired 
workers outside of the employment exchanges.98 In June 1932, 1200 harvest-workers 
went on strike in a town in Toledo to force the employers to dismiss the non-local 
workers.99 In another town in Toledo, a group of local workers entered a farm to 
throw out a group of about 40 non-locals. In Lebrija (Sevilla), strikers entered the 
cortijos to evict the non-local workers and the clash with the Guardia Civil left 3 
workers wounded.100 In Torredonjimeno (Jaén), workers complained employers were 
not contracting through the local exchange and the strikers forced the forastero 
workers to leave.101 In July 1932, in Arévalo (Ávila) local workers prevented 
forasteros to work the fields whilst on strike.102 In June 1934, workers from Linares 
(Jaén) shot a group of strikebreakers from Bailén and Jabalquinta (also in Jaén), 
seriously wounding several of them.103 Workers from Montejo (Badajoz) were 
reported to enter a cortijo to expel the forastero workers, who had to be protected by 
the Guardia Civil.104  In Villafranca or in Fuenteobejuna (Córdoba), the strikes of 
June 1934 ended with non-locals being expelled from the towns.105  
 
In light of these levels of conflict, our claim is that temporary migrations were 
seriously disrupted, not that the disappeared completely. The prefect of Jaén 
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complained several owners were employing non-local workers for the harvest.106 
When the workers of Mocejón or Malpica (both in Toledo) went on strike in June 
1932, there were groups of forastero harvesters ready to take up their jobs.107 When 
about 200 workers working in the dam of Guadalcacín (Cádiz) went on strike, there 
were non-local workers ready to take up their jobs.108 In Cañizo (Zamora) a worker 
was shot to death by the Guardia Civil, which had clashed with a group of strikers 
protesting against the employment of forasteros.109 In Villanueva de San Carlos 
(Ciudad Real), local workers entered a finca to evict the temporary migrants 
employed there.110 
 
Although locals could strike against the employment of temporary migrants, 
the main tool used by the rural unions to guarantee local workers got jobs first was the 
local census or list of workers, which also established the order in which workers 
would be hired, the turno. The surviving collective contracts we have all established 
the priority of local workers when there were unemployed or underemployed local 
workers. Mariano González-Rothvoss compiled 36 local, regional or provincial rural 
collective contracts for the agricultural sector, which covered a majority of rural wage 
labour in the years 1932-1934. Of those, a third did not contain clauses establishing 
the conditions to hire workers. About two thirds instead had clauses stipulating it was 
compulsory to hire from the local workers’exchange and the priority of local workers 
over non-locals (in industrial labour markets about half stipulated it was compulsive 
for employers to hire from the labour exchange).111  
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The qualitative evidence also points at substantial changes of labour recruiting 
practices. Traditionally, workers were recrutied by the cortijo overseers for the day or 
a particular job in the squares of towns. In the 1930s, the union now organized this 
service in towns as far apart as Mijas (Almería), Los Olivos (Huelva), La Solana 
(Ciudad Real) and Belmonte de los Caballeros (Aragón). In the case of Mijas, Ronald 
Fraser showed how the union organized the matching of vacancies and the list of 
employable workers.112 Jerome Mintz mentioned the testimony of a worker in Casas 
Viejas arguing he joined the union because “they said if one didn’t sign with the 
sindicato, one could not get work.113 Carmelo Lisón-Tolosana, in the case of 
Balmonte de los Caballeros (in Aragón), emphasized the union’s role in controlling 
the labour exchange and described the way in which these local exchanges worked: 
 
“In the town the union took the following form: a tavern in the market square was used as a 
labour exchange, membership of which was obligatory. If a farmer needed a labourer or labourers for 
work in his fields, he was not allowed to deal with them directly nor could they offer their services to 
anyone. They had to go to the exchange, give their names, and usually to wait there in the tavern until 
someone wanting farmhands that day employed the man or men whose names were at the top of the 
list.” 114 
 
In Socialists of rural Andalusia, George A. Collier’s discusses how in 1931 
the union contested the hiring of workers for municipal public works by the 
conservative mayor and insisted “that workers had to join the union in order to be 
eligible for wages paid from public funds earmarked to relieve the crisis obrera.”115 
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The union also defined who was eligible for harvest or municipal jobs: “some of the 
small holders and artisans who had joined the union initially to have access to jobs 
found themselves defined patronos (employers) when they hired other workers.”116 
Fernando del Rey shows how unions arranged for the contracting of unemployed rural 
workers in municipal public works schemes as a way of combating unemployment , a 
strategy that discriminated in favor of UGT members.117 If we look at the grievances 
of the massive general strike of June 1934, its main demands had to do with specific 
organization clauses but the most important was the turno, the order in which workers 
would be offered a job, always prioritizing local workers over temporary migrants. 
Other important demands were the banning of mechanical reapers, the drawing up of 
new collective contracts and the creation of local committees to enforce them.118 
 
How can we finally reconcile the whole qualitative evidence? Probably the 
best evidence comes from looking at real wages in rural labour markets, in which it is 
clear unions’ control of labour markets in from 1918 to 1920 and the 1930s are 
associated with large real wage gains. The series used combines data on nominal 
wages with cost of living evidence for rural towns only. We compare this evidence 
with average real wages from the industrial sector (employing cost of living deflators 
from large cities).119 
 
As figure 1 shows, rural wages were substantially eroded by inflation in the 
years of the World War I. This contrasts with moderate real wage declines in industry 
where wages were clearly “stickier”. Despite high inflation, rural unions were able to 
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increase real wages in 1918-1920, and obtain moderate nominal wage gains in 1921 
and 1922, which combined with deflation increased real wages further. The 1920s, 
when unions were not legal, are characterized by stagnant real wages. The 1928 
increase is both a small nominal wage increase of 6 per cent combined with a 
deflation of the cost of living of 11 per cent. In 1929 and 1930 inflation eroded real 
wages. It was in the 1930s that large nominal wage gains clearly outstripped moderate 
inflation rates. With plausibly low or zero labour productivity changes in the large 
latifundia regions (where mechanization advanced only slowly) and stagnant wheat 
prices between 1925 and 1935, those real wage gains most plausibly reflect rents 
captured by the unions for the local workers.120 This in fact probably reflected a 
redistribution of rents away from employers and non-local workers towards the “local 
workers”.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
Summing up: in rural labour markets, the crippling effect of temporary 
migrations on the growth and stabilization of unions disappeared in the 1930s. The 
evidence so far presented on strikes and conflicts also shows that unions made great 
efforts to control the access to jobs and the labour exchanges. Legislation to a great 
extent was enforced, although not fully enforced. By being able to restrict the 
mobility of temporary workers, unions were boosted by a situation that was very close 
to a full closed shop, which sorted out the phenomenal collective active problems that 
were typical in the organization of the landless workers. “Local” workers captured the 
rents available in harvest work, to the detriment of employers and non-local workers. 
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This does not mean rural workers did not care for working conditions and 
employment in a labour market context in which the supply of labour clearly 
outstripped the demand for labour. It also does not mean their living standards were 
not low and their working conditions hard by any current standard. But the explosive 
participation we see in the 1930s certainly had to do with the existence of very strong 
incentives to join the union and participate in strikes, which explains the phenomenal 
organizational success of the socialist General Workers’ Union in the 1930s, 
especially after 1932. In markets traditionally characterized by free entry, unions’ 
control of labour market meant rural workers captured substantial rents. 
 
Conclusions  
What explains the gigantic increase in social unrest in 1930s Spain? Traditional 
explanations in the literature have focussed on the inherent unruliness of the popular 
masses, the unavoidable revolutionary roots of the Spanish labour movement, the 
effects of poverty, unemployment, and declining living standards, or the side-effects 
of the repression of the labour movement by the state. This paper instead argues that 
fundamental changes in labour markets and their institutions, especially in rural 
labour markets, are key to understand the explosive growth of strikes and union 
membership in the 1930s. First of all, by reducing the prevalence of temporary 
migrations, unions were able to protect themselves from strikebreakers. Moreover, via 
the employment exchanges, unions and permanent workers were able to rigidly 
control the entry of new workers into the labour market. This historical case study 
illuminates two aspects of collective action theory. First, it shows that unions might 
have trouble in reconciling the preferences of very different sets of workers. Second, 
it shows how unions and other collective action movements obtain large increases in 
 39
membership by making membership compulsive or by substantially increasing the 
costs of not-participating. Obviously, this does not diminish the fairness of the 
grievances put forward by Spanish unions in the 1930s, but rather it is more telling of 
fundamental aspects of mass social movements, especially in a context of a 
developing economy. 
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FIGURE 1. Average real wages in industry and agriculture, 1913=100. 
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